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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of international commercial courts aims to
boost income from legal services and serve as a catalyst for newly
found rules of law and thus attract investor confidence. The latter is the underlying purpose for the creation of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) and its Court. The Court’s
legal framework is set out in the tradition of its competitors in
the Gulf and similarly employs an impressive lineup of former
senior judges from the United Kingdom. It is a unique experiment because it strives to create a balance between maintaining
a judicial institution of the highest caliber while at the same
time being subject to several limitations that jeopardize its independence. As companies in the AIFC continue to grow in size
and assets, the AIFC Court will inevitably become one of the key
dispute resolution institutions in Asia over the next decade.
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INTRODUCTION

The provision of efficient legal services has emerged as an
industry in and of itself throughout the last decade.1 Industrialized and newly-wealthy countries have realized that speedy
and effective dispute resolution mechanisms anchored within
national legal systems have the potential to attract interested
fee-paying end-users while benefiting the local legal profession
and peripheral services, such as translators, clerks, legal executives, administrators, and others.2 When a professional activity
becomes an industry it also feeds into the local economy.3 Legal
fees generate taxes4 and end-users must use hotels, restaurants,
public and private transport, and airlines. Additionally, if they
have enjoyed their experience, end-users will most likely return
as tourists. The legal services sector in the UK is estimated to
contribute three percent of the country’s GDP,5 and a large part
of that is due to the London Commercial Courts,6 which largely
attract international end-users.7 Therefore, it is no wonder that
English courts have the most cost-effective court fees among all
of their global competitors.8
1 Everyone’s a Law Company, PRACTICE, July–Aug. 2019, https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/everyones-a-law-company/.
2 See Suzanne Van Arsdale, User Protections in Online Dispute Resolution, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 107, 109, 125, 132–33 (2015).
3 See Horst Eidenmuller, The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory
Competition, and Transnational Corporations, 18 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD.
707, 713 (2011).
4 Robert W. Wood, IRS Form 1099 Rules for Settlements and Legal Fees,
BUS. L. TODAY (Jan. 28, 2020), https://businesslawtoday.org/2020/01/irs-form1099-rules-settlements-legal-fees/.
5 See THECITYUK, LEGAL EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONALLY RENOWNED
(2017), which demonstrates that the legal sector alone was found to generate
311,000 jobs in the U.K.
6 See Commercial Court, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/commercial-court (last visited Sept. 23, 2020), for a discussion regarding
the London Commercial Courts, which is a subdivision of the Queen’s Bench
Division of the High Court of Justice and is comprised of several specialist
chambers, including insurance, construction, contract and business, financial,
commercial and others.
7 In 2017–18, 70% of the Commercial Court’s work was intentional in nature. See JUDICIARY OF ENG. & WALES, THE COMMERCIAL COURT REPORT 2017–
2018 7, 9 (2019).
8 The courts of England and Wales do not charge a daily hearing fee and
are thus the cheapest forum to settle disputes compared to both other courts,
and in relation to arbitration. See Queen Mary Univ. of London Sch. of Int’l
Arb., Ctr. for Com. L. Stud., Competitiveness of fees charged for Commercial
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This “legal services tourism” (LST) is wholly different from
the notion of forum shopping. The latter assumes that a person,
natural or legal, manipulates his or her personal circumstances,
chief residence, incorporation, seat, or other, with the purpose of
sustaining a civil suit in the courts of a country that would ordinarily deny jurisdiction.9 LST concerns a much broader and
comprehensive commercial undertaking—the courts and legal
services are just part of a larger undertaking whereby end-users
move part or all of their business activities to a tailor-made financial center or financial economic zone10 operating within a
state. These zones offer competitive corporate tax rates, hasslefree administrative services—including the elimination of red
tape and bureaucracy—as well as the promise of a global hub for
business.11 One main attraction of such financial zones is an
established court composed of largely international, highly experienced judges, with use of the English language,12 and operational transnational laws13 and principles that are no different
from London and New York.14 Hence, these hybrid transnational commercial courts operate as independent judicial entities
wholly outside the procedural and substantive laws of the country hosting them and thus provide an additional layer of guarantees for investors that are otherwise suspicious of the

Court Services: An overview of selected jurisdictions 3 (2013).
9 See Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong with That?, 24
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 25–26 (2005), who addresses why forum shopping
should be considered wrong as a general rule.
10 The impact of special economic zones on the rule of law in the target
country has received little attention, but see MADELEINE MARTINEK,
EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION IN CHINA BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND LEGALITY: THE
DELEGATED LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
321–22 (2018), for a discussion of the improvement of the legal design of experimental regulations in special economic zones which is done by striking a balance between the pursuit of rapid socioeconomic progress on the one hand, and
the increasing need and will to govern by the rule of law on the other.
11 Id. at 322.
12 Christoph A. Kern, English as a Court Language in Continental Courts,
5 ERASMUS L. REV. 187, 188–89, 193, 209 (2012).
13 See Legal High Comm. for Fin. Mkts. of Paris, Recommendations for the
Creation of Special Tribunals for International Business Disputes 4, 13 (2017),
https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/rapport_07_a.pdf, for a
study regarding whether there was a need for Paris to establish an Englishspeaking chamber.
14 Id. at 12–13.
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independence of ordinary local courts and institutions.15 Such
hybrid courts must also compete with the institution of arbitration, which the parties have recourse to, as well as the jurisdiction of other courts, which investors in a financial zone may
simply choose through choice of forum clauses in their contracts.16 At the same time, it should not be forgotten that certain
long-entrenched institutions attract end-users for particular disputes, but not for others.17 For example, one of the perceived
advantages of New York City arbitration is that even mistakes
of fact and law do not warrant vacatur of an otherwise rational
award.18
In the last two decades, three broad types of hybrid transnational commercial courts (HTCC) have been established.19
The first is grounded in and is an integral part of quasi-independent financial centers, like the Qatar International Court
and Dispute Resolution Centre (QICDRC), which is an entity of
the Qatar Financial Center (QFC), formerly known as the Commercial and Civil Court of the Qatar Financial Center.20 The
QICDRC’s jurisdiction is grounded in the governing law of the
QFC.21 The same is true of the Dubai International Financial

Eidenmuller, supra note 3, at 715.
Id. at 722–23.
17 See id., for an explanation that end users may choose to resolve disputes
at these institutions for reasons such as “the quality of the judges and courts,”
a neutral venue, and the institutions’ levels of professionalism.
18 See Hackett v. Milbank, 86 N.Y.2d 146, 155 (1995), which demonstrates
that few, if any, stay claims will ever be successful in this jurisdiction.
19 Stephan Wilske, International Commercial Courts and Arbitration—
Alternatives, Substitutes or Trojan Horse?, 11 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 153, 156
(2018).
20 History–Origins of the Court, QATAR INT’L CT. & DISP. RESOL. CTR.,
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/history-origins-court (last visited Sept. 25, 2020).
21 “The QFC was established by Law No. 7/2005 (the ‘QFC law’).” Zain Al
Abdin Sharar & Michael Earley, The Qatar International Court: Judicial Update, MENA BUS. L. REV. 46, 47 (2018). “The QFC consists of the QFC Authority, the QFC Regulatory Authority, the Regulatory Tribunal, and the Civil and
Commercial Court.” Id. Article 34 of the Court’s Regulations and Procedural
Rules grants the court wide enforcement powers. Id. More specifically, Article
34(3)(2) authorizes the Court to make “any order that it considers necessary in
the interests of justice.” Id. “In addition, Schedule 6(16) of the QFC Law allows
the QIC to use the provisions of the [Qatari] Civil and Commercial Procedures
Law (Qatar Law No. 13/1990) where the QFC Law and Regulations are silent
on a concerned matter.” Id.
15
16
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Center (DIFC) Courts, whose jurisdiction emanates from DIFCrelated disputes.22 In fact, the DIFC has generated so much case
law that it has succeeded to establish itself as a distinct and
highly original legal system far beyond the otherwise forwardlooking legal system of Dubai and the Emirates.23 The subject
matter of this article, the Court of the Astana Financial Services
Centre, is part of this paradigm, as this Court’s creators aimed
to emulate the DIFC court model.24 An additional element that
renders these courts attractive is the autonomy of parties to
choose the governing law of their choice.25 For example, the
QICDRC is meant to apply QFC law and regulations as well as
the law set out by the parties in their contractual relationships,26
albeit in practice the Court relies predominantly on common law
principles and case law. This is not only because these principles
and cases are more familiar to the majority of the judges, but
also because English law is the predominant law in a majority
of transnational commercial agreements.27 By way of illustration, in Leonardo S.p.A v. Doha Bank Assurance Company, the
Court was faced with demand guarantees under the Uniform
Rules for Demand Guarantees, which were adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce in 1991.28 Even so, the Court
22 See Jayanth K. Krishnan & Priya Purohit, A Common Law Court in an
Uncommon Environment: The DIFC Judiciary and Global Commercial Dispute
Resolution, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 497, 497–98 (2014).
23 Jayanth K. Krishnan, The Story of the Dubai International Financial
Center Courts: A Retrospective 5 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law, Research Paper
No.
404,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3280883.
24 Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar, The Court of the Astana International Financial Center in the Wake of Its Predecessors, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 121, 122 (2019).
25 Id. at 128.
26 See QATAR FIN. CTR. LAW NO. 7 OF 2005 [QFC LAW NO. 7] (including
amendments made by Law No. 14 of 2009), https://qfcra-en.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/net_file_store/QFC_Law-V3-Oct09.doc.pdf. This is
also spelled out in Article 11 of the Court’s Regulations and Procedural Rules,
whereas Article 4 enunciates the principle of the “overriding objective” of the
Court, which is to “deal with all cases justly.” THE QATAR FIN. CTR. CIV. AND
COM.
CT.
REGULS.
AND
PROCEDURAL
RULES
arts.
4,
11,
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/sites/default/files/s3/wysiwyg/qfc_civil_and_commercial_court_regulations_date_of_issuance_15_december_2010_0.pdf.
27 See generally Why English Law Governs Most International Commercial Contracts, QLTSCHOOL (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.qlts.com/blog/whyenglish-law-governs-most-international-commercial-contracts (discussing why
English law is preferred).
28 Leonardo S.p.A v. Doha Bank Assurance Co., Case No. 12 of 2019,
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went on to examine the nature of such guarantees by reference
to English case law.29
The second type of HTCC is composed of expert judicial
chambers, in addition to the existing judicial architecture of the
states in which they are situated.30 The jurisdiction of these
chambers is triggered by a choice of forum clause in the parties’
agreement.31 The primary consideration of such courts is to offer
English-language dispute resolution in relation to complex
transnational commercial disputes through speedy procedures
and unlimited party autonomy, while still grounded in a stable,
respectable, and well-performing legal system.32 This is the case
with the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC),
whose rationale is, no doubt, rather different from the HTCC encountered in the previous paragraph.33 The SICC is part of the
Singapore Supreme Court and constitutes a division of the High
Court.34 In accordance with section 18(d) of the Supreme Court
of Judicature Act, the SICC has conferred jurisdiction over disputes of an international and commercial nature submitted to it
expressly by the parties and it may also hear cases transferred
to it by the High Court.35 Hence, the SICC seeks to emulate the
success of the London Commercial Court,36 and to a great degree,

Judgment, Civ. and Com. Ct. of the Qatar Fin. Ctr. App. Div., ¶ 44 (2020),
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/sites/default/files/s3/judgments/english/case_no_12_of_2019_judgment_16_march_2020.pdf.
29 Id. ¶ 42.
30 See Wilske, supra note 19, at 157–59.
31 See Man Yip, The Singapore International Commercial Court: The Future of Litigation?, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 81, 85 (2019); Hague Convention on
Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements art. 3,
June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294; see also Vinmar Overseas (Sing.) Pte Ltd. v.
PTT Int’l Trading Pte Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 159 of 2017, Judgment, Sing. Ct.
App. (SGCA) ¶ 122 (2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/docs/defaultsource/module-document/judgement/final-version-for-release-(v1)-pdf-1.pdf,
for an example of how the Singapore Court of Appeals ruled on choice of court
agreements and the element of party autonomy.
32 Yeshnah D. Rampall & Ronan Feehily, The Sanctity of Party Autonomy
and the Powers of Arbitrators to Determine the Applicable Law: The Quest for
an Arbitral Equilibrium, 23 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 345, 348 (2018).
33 Yip, supra note 31, at 86.
34 Id. at 84.
35 Supreme Ct. of Judicature Act, 2007, ch. 322, § 18(d) (Sing.).
36 See Man Yip, The Resolution of Disputes before the Singapore International Commercial Court, 65 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 439, 445 (2016).
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it has succeeded.37 The Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)
and The Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal (NCCA),38
which falls within this type of HTCC, is a specialist chamber of
the Amsterdam District Court and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal.39 Equally, the China International Commercial Court
(CICC), which was set up by the Chinese Supreme Court, has a
similar remit.40 In fact, the CICC’s jurisdiction is the result of
an interpretation issued by the Supreme Court and, as a result,
it is subject to the Chinese Civil Procedure Law.41 Such specialist chambers have not necessarily been welcomed by national
parliaments, as the political tensions underlying the proposed
Brussels International Business Court (BIBC)42 and a similar
37 See SING. INT’L COM. CT., REPORT OF THE SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL COURT COMMITTEE ¶ 6 (2013) (“The SIAC is the fourth most preferred arbitral institution (after the International Chamber of Commerce
(‘ICC’), the London Court of International Arbitration (‘LCIA’) and the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (‘ICDR’)) . . . .”).
38 NETH. COM. CT., https://netherlands-commercial-court.com/# (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
39 Neth. Com. Ct., Rules of Proc. for the Int’l Com. Chambers of the Amsterdam District Court (NCC District Court) and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (NCC Court of Appeal), DE RECHTSPRAAK, art. 1.1, § 1.1.1 (2018),
https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/ncc-procesreglementen.pdf; Jurisdiction of the Netherlands Commercial Court, NETH. COM. CT.,
https://netherlands-commercial-court.com/jurisdiction-netherlands.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2020); see also Georgia Antonopoulou & Xandra Kramer, The
Netherlands Commercial Court holds its first hearing!, CONFLICT LAWS.NET
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://conflictoflaws.net/2019/the-netherlands-commercialcourt-holds-its-first-hearing/ (delivering the court’s first judgment concerning
an application for court permission to privately sell pledged shares).
40 See A Brief Introduction of China International Commercial Court,
CHINA INT’L COM. CT., http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/195/index.html
(last updated June 28, 2018).
41 Lance Ang, International Commercial Courts and the Interplay Between
Realism and Institutionalism: A Look at China and Singapore, HARV. INT’L L.
J.: ESSAYS, ONLINE SCHOLARSHIP (Mar. 2020), https://harvardilj.org/2020/03/international-commercial-courts-and-the-interplay-between-realism-and-institutionalism-a-look-at-china-and-singapore/; see also China Guiding Cases Project, Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the
Establishment of the International Commercial Courts, STAN. L. SCH. (July 1,
2018), https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/belt-and-road/b-and-r-texts/20180701-provisions-re-intl-commercial-courts/, for a list of five types of cases the CICC has
jurisdiction over per Article 2 of the CICC Provisions.
42 See Erik Peetermans & Philippe Lambrecht, The Brussels International
Business Court: Initial Overview and Analysis, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 42, 43–44,
44 n.21, 48 & n.81 (2019), for a discussion of the bills establishing the Brussels
International Business Court including, Parl. St./Doc. parl. (Parliamentary
Documents): Kamer/Chambre (Belgian House of Representatives) 54,
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English-speaking chamber in Germany exemplify.43
The third type, which is not a distinct mechanism, but rather merges elements of all the aforementioned structures, concerns the function of several HTCC to assist arbitral proceedings.44 In this sense, chambers serve as flexible and highly
expert ‘competent courts’ in the sense of article 6 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.45 Examples of these types of HTCC include the Amsterdam
International Commercial Court,46 the QICDRC,47 and the AIFC
Court,48 among others.
It is within this context that the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) and its Court are examined.49 The AIFC
and the Court are the result of a troubled past during which the
newly founded Republic of Kazakhstan tried to grapple with the
3072/007, at 59, and Parl. St./Doc. parl. (Parliamentary Documents): Kamer/Chambre (Belgian House of Representatives) 54, 3072/010, at 4, which indicate that the absence of an English-speaking chamber in any existing Belgian court is due to the Belgian legislature’s reluctance in that creating one
will only increase the number of disputes and how the Court outsources for
“specialist” judges who must speak English and have expertise in international
trade law. See also 2020 CONST. art. 151 (Belg.) (indicating that the High Council of Justice for all of Belgium is composed of a Dutch-speaking college and a
French-speaking college).
43 Jenny Gesley, Germany: Regional Court of Frankfurt Establishes English-Speaking Chamber for Commercial Matters, LIBR. CONG. (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-regional-court-of-frankfurt-establishes-english-speaking-chamber-for-commercial-matters/; see also
Gesetzentwurf [Cabinet draft], Deutscher Bundersrat: Drucksachen [BR]
53/18 (Ger.) (establishing an English-speaking chamber for international commercial matters in Germany).
44 See History–Origins of the Court, supra note 20 (listing the variety of
disputes heard in the QICDRC).
45 See ILIAS BANTEKAS ET AL., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A COMMENTARY 96–103 (2020).
46 See, e.g., Art. 4:1020–73 RV (Neth.).
47 See Qatar Int’l Ct. and Disp. Resol. Ctr., Law No. 2 of 2017 Promulgating the Civ. and Com. Arbitration Law, art. 1 (Qatar),
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/107697/132714/F1501879919/law_no._02_2017_promulgating_the_civil_and_comm.pdf [hereinafter QFC Law No. 2].
48 See Astana Int’l Fin. Ctr., AIFC Arbitration Regulations ¶ 14 (2017)
(Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/73/file/aifc-arbitration-regulations-2017.pdf
[hereinafter AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017].
49 Id.
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legal implications of its vast oil and gas deposits.50 Despite its
wealth and its liberal attitude towards trade and investment, at
least in contrast to most of its Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan’s laws have always been in a constant state of flux and
rushed amendments.51 In addition, foreign investors have never
really seen the country’s legal regime as stable or arbitrationfriendly.52 Kazakhstan’s court system is notoriously biased in
favor of government entities, and its inward investment in fields
other than energy have been weak.53 Because of this, it is not
surprising that foreign investors and those engaging in transborder commerce have sought to make use of arbitration to resolve disputes, whether with government entities or other private entities.
The AIFC is a relative newcomer to the various hybrid commercial courts mainly in the Gulf.54 The AIFC itself was not only
set up to emulate those financial centers but also, and more importantly, to alleviate Kazakhstan’s poor investment image
abroad.55 It is not enough to set up one semi-autonomous financial center, even with a court comprising eminent international
judges, in an attempt to fix Kazakhstan’s tarnished image. The
very fact that the Kazakhstani capital was moved from Almaty

50 See ILIAS BANTEKAS ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW IN
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 229–31 (2004).

KAZAKHSTAN: NATIONAL

51 See, e.g., POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT UNIT:
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION, REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN TAX STRATEGY
PAPER REPORT NO. 36494-KZ VOLUME 1: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR INCREASING THE
NEUTRALITY OF THE TAX SYSTEM IN NON-EXTRACTIVE SECTORS 1, 39 (2008) (criticizing “the arbitrary and unpredictable methods of raising revenues”).
52 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2018
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan 8–10 (2018).
53 See Paul Stronski, Kazakhstan at Twenty-Five: Stable but Tense,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (Feb. 4, 2016), https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/04/kazakhstan-at-twenty-five-stable-but-tense-pub-62642.
54 See Barclay Ballard, Kazakhstan’s capital seeks new role amid shifting
global markets, WORLD FIN. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/kazakhstans-capital-seeks-new-role-amidst-shifting-global-markets.
55 See The Strategy for development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, OFF.
SITE PRESIDENT REPUBLIC KAZ., https://www.akorda.kz/en/official_documents/strategies_and_programs (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (noting that the
Kazakhstan 2030 Vision considered economic development through a financial
system as one of its seven priorities and the AIFC is a direct implementation
of this vision); Ailuna R. Utegenova, Kazakhstan’s 2030 Development Strategy:
Significance and Results, 2010 OSCE Y.B. 133, 136–37 (2011).
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to the steppes of Astana, which then assumed the name of the
Kazakhstani President (for life), Nursultan Nazarbayev, who
hails from Astana,56 is evidence of authoritarianism of the highest caliber. The Gulf states, on the other hand, already enjoyed
high volumes of commerce, trade, and successful attempts at
high technology before setting up financial centers to attract
more financial service providers.57 The rule of law in the Gulf is
strong despite the absence of democratic structures (at least in
the Western sense).58 Additionally, public institutions and the
standard of living in the Gulf far overshadow the standard of
living in Kazakhstan, even though the latter is vastly oil-rich,
has a relatively small population, and fertile land.59 It is, therefore, important to see the AIFC as part of a larger project, which
includes several special economic zones and the creation of the
Astana International Exchange (AIX).60 “The Shanghai Stock
Exchange, the US Nasdaq, the Beijing-sponsored Silk Road
Fund and Goldman Sachs all joined the AIFC Authority as
shareholders and strategic partners in the exchange.”61 The Kazakhstani government is committed to using the AIX to complete
its ambitious privatization process by listing minority stakes in

Ballard, supra note 54.
See Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Gulf States and the Rebalancing of
Regional and Global Power, 3–5 (Jan. 8, 2014) (working paper) (on file with the
Rice University James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy).
58 See Mark Fathi Massoud, International Arbitration and Judicial Politics in Authoritarian States, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 11–12 (2014).
59 See MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, KAZAKHSTAN: UNFULFILLED PROMISE? 3–10
(2d ed. 2010); Nadim Kawach, High living standards in UAE, GULF NEWS
(June 22, 2002), https://gulfnews.com/uae/high-living-standards-in-uae1.391517; Nazym Shedenova & Aigul Beimisheva, Social and Economic Status
of Urban and Rural Households in Kazakhstan, 82 PROCEDIA SOC. & BEHAV.
SCI. 585, 585–87 (2013).
60 See Overview: Astana International Exchange (AIX), ASTANA INT’L
EXCH., https://www.aix.kz/about-aix/overview/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2020). AIX
is an entity situated with the AIFC and it is regulated by the Astana Financial
Services Authority, which is an AIFC body. See id.; Rules and Regulations,
ASTANA INT’L EXCH., https://www.aix.kz/rules-regulations-2/rules-regulations/
(last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“Pursuant to Part 3, Chapter 2 of the AIFC Framework Regulations, AFSA has granted AIX a license to carry on one or more
Market Activities as an Authorised Market Institution.”).
61 Jacopo Dettoni, AIFC sets sights on central Asian financial hub status,
FDI INTEL. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.fdiintelligence.com/article/75360. For
a complete list of AIX’s trading partners, see Trading Members, ASTANA INT’L
EXCH., https://www.aix.kz/aix-membership/aix-members/trading-members/.
56
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some of the most prominent state enterprises.62
The AIFC Court is a welcome contribution to Kazakhstan’s
judiciary, but it must feed the latter with its exemplary work,
practices, and development of the law—both substantive and
procedural. If the AIFC Court remains a stand-alone island in
an ocean of ill-equipped, non-independent,63 largely biased national courts, and avoids externalizing its concern over the deterioration of the rule of law, its status and legitimacy will be compromised. Moreover, the AIFC Court will have to prove and
justify why foreign investors should endow it with jurisdiction
over and above arbitral tribunals64 seated outside Kazakhstan,
even in respect of entities incorporated or listed in the AIFC. At
the time of writing this article, the AIFC Court had issued only
a single order.65 At the same time, it has not attracted much
analysis from dispute resolution scholars,66 but this may be attributable to so-called “tribunal fatigue,” the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, and perhaps the fact that few
are optimistic that it will actually convince end-users of its
value.67 This author is hopeful that the AIFC and the AIFC
Dettoni, supra note 61.
See Klaus Schwab & Xavier Sala-i-Martín, The Global Competitiveness
Report,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
(2017–2018),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR20172018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2
017%E2%80%932018.pdf, for a survey on perceptions of judicial independence
conducted in 2017, where Kazakhstan scored a 3.7 out of a possible 7, which
shows some, but very few, signs of progress. See also Alexei Trochev, Between
Convictions and Reconciliations: Processing Criminal Cases in Kazakhstani
Courts, 50 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 107 (2017), for a more critical view of the perceptions of judicial independence.
64 See Queen Mary Univ. of London Sch. of Int’l Arb., Ctr. for Com. L.
Stud. & White & Case, 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution
of International Arbitration 2 (2018) (finding in one of the largest surveys of
corporate preferences that in respect to dispute resolutions, a staggering “97%
of respondents indicate[d] international arbitration is their preferred method
of dispute resolution . . . .”).
65 See Aurora AG Ltd. v. Star Asian Mining Co., Case No. AIFCC/SCC/2019/0001, Judgment, Small Claims Ct. of the AIFC, 2 (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://court.aifc.kz/uploads/Case%20No.%201%20of%202019%20-%20Aurora%20AG%20Limited%20v%20Star%20Asian%20Mining%20Company%20
LLP_eng.pdf, for an exemplification of a decision under the small claims’ procedures.
66 See Zambrana-Tévar, supra note 24, at 134.
67 See Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: International Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
62
63
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Court will realize the importance of this project for Kazakhstan
and will zealously guard its independence and legitimacy and
will contribute to the overall rule of law in Kazakhstan.
II. THE PLACE OF THE AIFC COURT IN THE AIFC
ARCHITECTURE
The AIFC Court is an entity—specifically a ‘body’—within
the general structure of AIFC.68 It is the existence of the AIFC
and its designated goals and activities that necessitate the creation of the Court.69 In the mold of the DIFC and the QFC, the
AIFC was conceived as a special economic zone70 meant to serve
as a conduit for the investment in Kazakhstan of financial, economic, and insurance service providers.71 “At the end of 2019,
the gross inflow of FDI to Kazakhstan amounted to $ 24.1 billion[,]”72 which is significant in its attempt to diversify the economy. The AIFC Constitutional Statute and succeeding acts and
regulations provide significant benefits to foreign financial investors.73 However, similar to the Gulf special economic zone
courts, it was recognized that, in the absence of a highly regarded court with special jurisdiction, the AIFC did not offer
substantial guarantees to investors.74 The creation of the AIFC
through constitutional law underpins its importance and distinguishes it from the other special economic zones operating in the

160, 160 (2000).
68 CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE NO. 438-V ZRK OF 7 [AIFC CONST. STATUTE]
art. 9(1), at 8 (Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/7/file/constitutional-statutewith-amendments-as-of-30-december-2019.pdf.
69 Id. art. 2, at 3.
70 By 2020 there were thirteen special economic zones in Kazakhstan. See
Special Economic Zone, KAZAKH INV. NAT’L CO. (2020), https://invest.gov.kz/doing-business-here/fez-and/. These are regulated by the Law of the Republic of
Kazakhstan No. 242-V art. 1 (Kaz.). See Ministry of Justice of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, On Judicial System and Status of Judges in the Republic of Kazakhstan, art. 38–1 (Apr. 3, 2019), http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z1900000242.
71 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 2, at 3.
72 Alzhanova Raushan, Volume of foreign investment gross inflow in Kazakhstan reached $ 350 bln, KAZINFORM INT’L NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 8, 2020,
10:20 AM), https://www.inform.kz/en/volume-of-foreign-investment-gross-inflow-in-kazakhstan-reached-350-bln_a3635217.
73 Towards Best Practice Guidelines for the Development of Economic
Zones, MENA-OCED INV. PROGRAMME 1, 8 (Nov. 23, 2009),
https://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/44866585.pdf.
74 Id. at 8–9.
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country. It is also part of the constitutional reforms which have
taken place with a view to better separation of powers in accordance with the requirements of the Council of Europe and the
Venice Commission.75
The AIFC Constitutional Statute distinguishes between
AIFC bodies and AIFC participants.76 The former consists of the
public entities that comprise the AIFC itself, each of which possesses a distinct legal personality and powers.77 The AIFC bodies are the Management Council, the AIFC Governor, the AIFC
Authority, the Astana Financial Services Authority, the AIFC
Court, and the International Arbitration Centre.78 AIFC participants comprise legal entities registered under the AIFC Acting
Law, as well as legal entities recognized by AIFC.79
III. JURISDICTION OF THE AIFC COURT
Article 13(4) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute sets out the
jurisdiction of the AIFC Court.80 While excluding authority over
criminal and administrative proceedings, its jurisdiction encompasses: “(1) disputes between AIFC Participants [inter se], AIFC
Participants and AIFC Bodies and an AIFC Participant or AIFC
Body and its expatriate Employees; (2) disputes relating to activities conducted in the AIFC and governed by the Acting Law
of the AIFC; [and] (3) disputes transferred to the AIFC Court by
agreement of the parties.”81 Section 26(1) of the 2017 AIFC
75 See Eur. Consult. Ass., Kazakhstan Opinion on the Amendments to the
Constitution, 110th Plen. Sess., Doc. No. 882 (2017), where the Venice Commission remarked the progress that had been made; particularly, in regard to
the devolution of power from the President, adding in paragraph 19 that, “[t]he
draft propose[d] to abolish the right of the President to issue decrees having
the force a law, which will certainly strengthen the legislative power.” “However, the possibility to establish priorities in the adoption of different pieces of
legislation might somewhat reduce the positive impact of this important
change.” Id.
76 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 1(5), (9), at 3, 8.
77 Id. art. 9, at 8.
78 Id.
79 Id. art. 1(5), at 3.
80 Id. art. 13(4), at 10.
81 Id. art. 13(4)(1)–(3), at 10. Curiously, this wording was slightly altered
in Art 26(1)(b) of the AIFC Court Regulations. See Astana Int’l Fin. Ctr., AIFC
Court Regulations: Resolution of the AIFC Management Council, pt. 5, § 26(1),
at 16 (2017) (Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/68/file/3.-legislation-aifc-court-
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Court Regulations includes an additional strand of jurisdiction
in subsection (d), namely, “the interpretation of AIFC Acts.”82
Unlike the QFC Court, which has authority over regulatory
issues, which, in turn, may be viewed as administrative matters,
the AIFC Court does not have such jurisdiction.83 Even so, in a
dispute between an AIFC participant and an AIFC body, it is
more than likely that the Court will have to pass judgment on
regulatory or administrative issues, particularly where a participant claims that a body has acted ultra vires or in violation of
the AIFC Acts. If such claims were to be viewed by the Court or
the AIFC Bodies as “administrative” matters or proceedings
and, hence, beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, it is unlikely
that foreign investors would make much use of the Court.84 Section 26(2) of the AIFC Court Regulations emphasizes that the
term “disputes” “applies to civil or commercial disputes arising
from transactions, contracts, arrangements or incidences.”85
This, no doubt, excludes the range of administrative contracts
and transactions entered into between private investors (AIFC
participants) and AIFC bodies.86 As a result, it is wholly unlikely that AIFC participants will not subject such matters to
commercial or investment arbitration. One must look to the

regulations-2017.pdf [hereinafter AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017]. In particular, “activities” is replaced by “operations,” whereas “governed” is replaced by “regulated.” Id. pt. 5, § 26(1), at 16. Moreover, “Acting Law of the AIFC” is replaced
by “the law of the AIFC.” Id. It is not clear if this is merely a drafting oversight
or a conscious choice with clear implications.
82 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(1)(d), at 16.
83 Qatar Fin. Ctr. Regul. Auth., Introducing the Qatar Financial Centre
Regulatory Authority 2–3 (2020).
84 At the time of writing, Kazakhstan was in the process of finalizing an
administrative code, replacing all other discrete acts. See Eur. Consult. Ass.,
Kazakhstan Opinion on the Amendments to the Constitution, 116th Plen. Sess.,
Doc. No. 931 (2018) [hereinafter Kaz. Op. on Amend. to Const.]. Article 30 of
this code defines an administrative body as “a public body, a local authority, as
well as other organisations which are authorised under the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan to perform activities in the sphere of state governance of
aimed at ensuring the interests of state and public (public functions).” Id. pt.
IV, § f, ¶ 35, at 9.
85 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(2), at 16.
86 See Kaz. Op. on Amend. to Const., supra note 84, pt. V, ¶¶ 51–52, at 11
(emphasizing that the draft administrative code was unclear about the jurisdiction of administrative courts, which might limit the discretion of the AIFC
Court and certainly renders its authority in these matters unclear).
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various entities established by AIFC bodies to ascertain whether
disputes arising from those bodies fall within the jurisdiction of
the AIFC Court. The AIX Business Rules, for example, specify
that the “[r]ules shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws, acts and regulations of the AIFC and each
Member irrevocably submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
AIFC Court and its legal jurisdiction.”87 Subsequently, all members waive the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the AIFC
Court.88
Paragraph five of Section 26 of the AIFC Court Regulations
make a slight exception to the “administrative process” exception.89 It stipulates that:
The [AIFC] Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to hear and
determine an appeal from the decision of an AIFC Body, Organisation, or Participant, as provided for in the AIFC Constitutional
Statute, AIFC Regulations, AIFC Court Rules, or other AIFC
Rules where the appeal relates to: (a) a question of law; (b) an allegation of a miscarriage of justice; (c) an issue of procedural fairness; or (d) a matter provided for in or under AIFC law.90

Section 26(1) makes it clear that, with respect to the first two
categories of disputes (a and b), the AIFC Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction.91 Although the chapeau (i.e. paragraph 1) implies that exclusive jurisdiction applies also with respect to disputes transferred to the Court by agreement of the parties and
the interpretation of AIFC Acts, it goes on to state in paragraph
three of Section 26 that, “[t]he reference to ‘transferred to the
Court by agreement of the parties’ in this Article applies to all
parties, including parties not registered in the AIFC, such that
all parties may ‘opt in’ to the jurisdiction of the Court by agreeing to give the Court jurisdiction pre or post-dispute.”92

87

ted).
88
89
90
91
92

Astana Int’l Exch. [AIX], AIX Business Rules art 1.19.1 (emphasis omitId. art. 1.19.2.
AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(5), at 16.
Id.
Id. pt. 5, § 26(1), at 16.
Id. pt. 5, § 26(3), at 16.
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The jurisdiction contemplated in paragraph three is of some
significance because assuming the AIFC bodies do not exercise
authoritarian rule against the interests of investors, the bulk of
disputes should be of a private nature between investors, their
contractors, and sub-contractors.93 If the AIFC and its Court
want to imitate the work and attractiveness of entities such as
the London Commercial Court or the DIFC, it must first attract
a critical mass of investors to the AIFC,94 which, in turn, will
generate a healthy string of cases not only between registered
participants but also non-registered parties. This, of course, implies that registered and non-registered parties will perceive the
AIFC Court as a better alternative to international commercial
arbitration, which is unlikely at this point.
Paragraph eight of Section 26 of the AIFC Court Regulations provides an additional dimension to the Court’s jurisdiction.95 It states that “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in relation to any matter in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred
on it by the AIFC Constitutional Statute or AIFC Regulations,
including with regards to the Court’s authority to perform functions to facilitate effective arbitration.”96
The only possible meaning underlying this provision must
be its reference to future forms of jurisdiction as and when the
AIFC Constitutional Statute or Regulations are amended. As to
the last part of Section 26(8), the Court is clearly referenced as
the “competent court” of AIFC arbitrations in the sense of Article
6 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration.97 This eventuality is analyzed in more detail in a

See AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(3), at 16.
By July 2019, there were 200 investors registered in the AIFC, including the China Construction Bank, which is the second largest asset globally.
See 200 companies registered in AIFC jurisdiction, ASTANA INT’L FIN. CTR. (July
2, 2019), https://aifc.kz/press-relizy/200-companies-registered-in-aifc-jurisdiction/.
95 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(8), at 17.
96 Id.
97 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985: with amendments
as adopted in 2006, ch. 1, art. 6, at 4 (Vienna: United Nations, 2008),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/0786998_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
93
94

17

18

PACE INT’L L. REV.

Vol. 33.1

subsequent section.
An issue that typically goes unnoticed in the statutes and
operations of specialized courts, such as the AIFC Court, is their
precise place within the complex web of private international
law, particularly where choice of forum is concerned.98 This issue is irrelevant in the sphere of arbitration because arbitration
very much excludes the application of private international law
unless the law of the seat deems otherwise.99 As a matter of
international law, it is unclear whether specialized hybrid courts
are part of the ordinary judicial machinery of the state in which
they are situated. If not, their status is similar to arbitral tribunals, but their judgments will not be considered awards under
the terms of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.100 Such a state of
affairs would place specialized courts at a disadvantage, not only
because it would disengage them from the global web of civil and
commercial courts and their ability to communicate through the
language of private international law, but it would also forbid
the parties from recognizing and enforcing judgments through
existing bilateral and multilateral channels because of a lack of
reciprocity. As a result, it is the position of this author that specialized courts—including the AIFC Court—are subject to the
entire gamut of private international law similar to Kazakhstani
courts.
These considerations have unfortunately not been addressed except for a partial explanation in a subsequent section
within the AIFC Court Regulations. Paragraph ten of Section
26 of the AIFC Court Regulations only refers to a jurisdictional
delimitation between the AIFC Court and the ordinary courts of
Kazakhstan, but again there is no clear rule as to how such

98 See Gordon Blanke, Dubai courts v DIFC courts: just a jurisdictional
stand-off or an outright declaration of war?, THOMSON REUTERS (June 12, 2017),
http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/dubai-courts-v-difc-courts-just-a-jurisdictional-stand-off-or-an-outright-declaration-of-war/.
99 See id.
100 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 5, at
9 (New York: United Nations, 1958) 4739 U.N.T.S. 330 [hereinafter The New
York Convention].
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delimitation is to be performed.101 It states that “[t]he Court
shall consider the express accord of the parties to a case that the
Court shall have jurisdiction and if the Court considers it desirable or appropriate, it may decline jurisdiction or may refer any
proceedings to another Court within the Republic of Kazakhstan.”102
This provision is confusing, to say the least, and contravenes
the express authority of the Court to entertain disputes referred
to it by registered and non-registered AIFC participants.103 How
then should the Court consider it “desirable” or “appropriate” to
decline jurisdiction and refer the parties to litigation before the
Kazakhstani courts? Several issues arise from this provision.
First, there is no apparent rule justifying referrals to Kazakhstani courts in the event that the AIFC Court determines that it
does not possess appropriate jurisdiction, especially if neither of
the parties are Kazakh.104 Second, it suggests, or is otherwise
not mindful, that the AIFC Court has no authority to apply the
ordinary Kazakhstani private international law rules in order to
determine the most appropriate jurisdiction for the dispute in
question.105 Third, it undermines party autonomy, which, by the
mutual choice of the AIFC Court, expressly and unequivocally
rejected the jurisdiction of Kazakhstani courts in the first
place.106 If foreign investors in the AIFC risk their disputes being referred to the Kazakhstani courts, which is the raison d’etre
for the creation of the AIFC and its Court, then it will soon become redundant.
The Appeals Chamber of the AIFC Court possesses jurisdiction, as already mentioned with respect to Section 26(1)(d) of the
AIFC Court Regulations, to interpret AIFC Acts.107 Such referrals effectively confer the status of “constitutional court” on the
AIFC Court in the same manner as the referral process to the

101
102
103
104
105
106
107

AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(10), at 17.
Id.
Id. pt. 5, § 26(3), at 16.
Id. pt. 5, § 26, at 16–17.
See id.
See id.
AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(1)(d), at 16.
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Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).108 Referrals
may only be made by: “(a) the Court of First Instance concerning
any matter before it; (b) any of the AIFC Bodies; or (c) any of the
AIFC Participants with leave of the Court of Appeal.”109
This jurisdiction, which feels natural to the Court, provides
an important function.110 This “constitutional” role is not unusual in closed systems such as the EU, QFC, and AIFC, but the
use of such authority across the various courts is hardly uniform.111 Some courts, such as the CJEU, are ambitious, farreaching, and not afraid to challenge their creators.112 In contrast, it is doubtful that specialized courts, such as the AIFC
Court, are prepared to challenge the boundaries of their mandate.
Finally, the jurisdiction of the AIFC Court encompasses a
small claims dimension. Paragraph seven of Article 26 states
that:
The Small Claims Court shall have a special fast track procedure
for claims below a specified value and Small Claims Court jurisdiction shall be defined in the AIFC Court Rules. Appeals of decisions of the Small Claims Court may be brought to the Court of
First Instance, subject to the permission of the Court as set out in
the AIFC Court Rules. No appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from
any judgment given of the Court of First Instance on an appeal
from the Small Claims Court.113

108 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326); AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017,
supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(1), at 16.
109 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(12)(a)–(c), at 17.
110 See id. pt. 9, § 38, at 23; see also LORD WOOLF, A VISION OF THE AIFC
COURT 28–29, 32–33 (Christopher Campbell-Holt ed., 2019) (providing information related to the AIFC Court’s jurisdiction and stating that the “natural
capacity of AIFC Court judges [is] to apply and interpret the AIFC law”).
111 Gerald Lebovits & Delphine Miller, Litigating in the Qatar International Court, 28 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N INT’L L. PRACTICUM 54, 54–56 (2015);
Gráinne de Búrca, Internalization of International Law by the CJEU and the
US Supreme Court, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 987, 987–89 (2015).
112 de Búrca, supra note 111, at 987–89.
113 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 5, § 26(7), at 17.
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A small claims jurisdiction exists in all specialized hybrid tribunals, which is pretty consistent with the statutes of all of the
AIFC Court’s competitors.114
IV. APPLICABLE LAW
The authority of the AIFC and its Court should be derived
from the Kazakhstani Constitution, whether directly or implicitly. Article 75(4) thereof clarifies that the Constitution shall
establish all courts and tribunals, and that “[t]he establishment
of special and emergency courts under any name is not allowed.”115 A 2017 amendment to the Constitution did in fact allow the legal regime of the AIFC to exist but did not specifically
refer to the AIFC Court.116 As a result, several experts have expressed concern as to whether the AIFC Court conforms with the
Kazakhstani Constitution.117 Article 13(2) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute exacerbates this state of affairs by declaring
that “[t]he AIFC Court is independent in its activities and is not
a part of the judicial system of the Republic of Kazakhstan.”118
Apart from the issue of constitutionality, which seems to have
been brushed under the carpet, it is not at all clear that the AIFC
Constitutional Statute is competent to make this sharp distinction between ordinary Kazakhstani courts and the AIFC Court.
This is so on account of several inter-connected considerations.
First, it may conflict with bilateral and multilateral treaties to
which Kazakhstan is a party, relating to the status and powers
of national courts.119 There would be nothing in those treaties

114 In fact, small claims judgments have seen a boost in DIFC and are
considered by many as the cornerstone of access to justice. See Press Release:
Commercial claims on the rise at DIFC Courts, DUBAI INT’L FIN. CTR., (Feb. 19,
2018, 4:49 AM), https://www.difc.ae/newsroom/news/commercial-claims-risedifc-courts/.
115 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, Aug. 30, 1995,
art. 75(4).
116 Id. art. 2(3-1).
117 Zambrana-Tévar, supra note 24, at 123 & n.33.
118 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(2), at 10.
119 See Maulenov K. Syrbaevich, Bilateral Investment Treaties of the Republic of Kazakhstan with Foreign States, 39 INST. LEGIS. REPUBLIC KAZ. 81,
81–87 (2015); see also International Investment Agreements Navigator: Kazakhstan, U.N. INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/107/kazakhstan (last visited Oct. 20,
2020), for a list of BITs to which Kazakhstan is a party.
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that allows member states to exclude application to one or more
judicial institutions, or conversely to unilaterally include an extraordinary judicial body outside of the ordinary justice system.120 Second, the AIFC Court would possess the authority to
make judgments and decisions only within the confines of the
AIFC, but these would have no force in Kazakhstan.121 In addition, the AIFC Court would have no authority similar to ordinary Kazakhstani courts in making domestic or worldwide injunctions and orders—including for reasons already stated.
Third, all these considerations make it unclear whether the
rules of private international law applicable to ordinary Kazakhstani courts also apply to the AIFC Court. We have already
stated that they do, but the AIFC Court, or other AIFC body,
may rely on Article 13(2) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute and
declare that it, in fact, does not.
In practice, and given Kazakhstan’s political climate, it
would be unrealistic for the Court or other AIFC Body to either
declare the AIFC Court unconstitutional—or that there is some
serious inconsistency between AIFC Acts and Kazakhstani
law—in such a manner that excludes the AIFC Court from Kazakhstan’s extensive treaty relations as they apply to its judicial
system. Claims of this nature that challenge the very legitimacy, lawfulness, and existence of an extraordinary court are
not unusual, and the courts in question have no problem providing extensive—and convincing—arguments in their favor.122 In
any event, the AIFC Court will take for granted that all AIFC
Acts are consistent and in conformity with the Kazakhstani Constitution.
Surprisingly, one finds a hierarchy of sources for the AIFC,
and implicitly for the Court, in Part 2, Section 8 of the AIFC
Regulations on AIFC Acts of 2017. This regulation states as follows:
See Syrbaevich, supra note 119.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN NO. 377-V
ZRK [KAZ. CODE OF CIV. PROC.] art. 7.
122 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm.
120
121
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(1) Correlation of legal force of Acting Law of the AIFC is construed in accordance with the following descending levels:
(a) paragraph 3-1 of article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan; and
(b) the Constitutional Statute; and
(c) the Management Council Resolution on AIFC Bodies; and
(d) Regulations; and
(e) Rules; and
(f) other Acts of relevant AIFC Bodies adopted to regulate
specific issues.123

This is a descending order, and the remainder of this provision
sets out a methodology for resolving conflicts between higher
and lower levels, as well as between equal levels.124 It should
have been stated from the outset that the “Acting Law of the
AIFC” encompasses the entire legal framework of the AIFC.
Paragraph five of Article 13 of the AIFC Constitutional Statute makes a remarkable statement about the actual law or “legal
system” that is meant to be applied as the default law—i.e. if the
parties have not already chosen a “law” or “legal system” in their
contract.125 This article states that “[t]he activities of the AIFC
Court are governed by the resolution of the Council On the Court
of Astana International Financial Centre, which is based on the
principles and legislation of the law of England and Wales and
the standards of leading global financial centres.”126
Although some word selection is unfortunate,127 the meaning is abundantly clear. The entirety of this section (on applicable law) is found, in principle, in this provision.128 Given that
the AIFC and its Court aspire to emulate the Gulf financial

123 AIFC, AIFC Reguls. on AIFC Acts No. 1 of 2017, pt. 2, ch. 1, § 8(1)(a)–
(f), at 5 (Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/207/file/1.-aifc-regulations-on-aifcacts-2017_new-design.pdf [hereinafter AIFC Regul. on AIFC Acts].
124 Id. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 8(2), at 5.
125 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(5), at 10.
126 Id.
127 While “activities” refers to the external/outer workings of the Court,
this confusingly encompasses administrative matters and its relation to the
state, whereas a better formulation would be: “the (default) law applicable to
legal proceedings before the Court . . . .”
128 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(5), at 10.
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centers,129 as well as the underlying notion that these are driven
by the common law, as applied by a selection of top judges, such
an applicable law makes eminent sense. In the opinion of this
author, the entire rationale for Article 13(5) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute is, at worst, misconceived, and, at best, misunderstood or overplayed. For one thing, the law of England and
Wales is not synonymous with the broader notion of the (transnational) common law applied by institutions such as the London Commercial Court, the DIFC, the QFC Court,130 and others.
In fact, these courts will apply English law and transnationalized common law only where the parties’ choice of law so dictates, or where it is appropriate.131 Neither Dubai nor Qatar has
substituted the substantive law of their specialized financial
centers with the law of another nation.132 The success of the Gulf
specialized courts lies in the fact that, by allowing unlimited
party autonomy over the choice of governing law, English law
has become predominant in the majority of agreements.133 It is
a natural extension for such courts to thereafter apply English
law to the cases before them. We have already referred to Leonardo S.p.A., where the QFC Court, in dealing with demand
guarantees under the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees—
an ICC instrument—went on to examine the nature of such
guarantees by reference to English case law.134
A contentious issue here concerns the scope of Article 13(5).
The law of England and Wales encompasses not only statutes
and the common law, but also obligations incumbent on the
United Kingdom by virtue of international treaties and

129 Matthew S. Erie, The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of
International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 60 VA. J. INT'L L. 225, 276–77
(2020).
130 See QFC LAW NO. 7, supra note 26, art. 7–8.
131 See Why English Law Governs Most International Commercial Contracts, supra note 27.
132 See Camille Paldi, Proposal for the Dubai World Islamic Finance Arbitration Tribunal (DWIFAC) and Jurisprudence Office (DWIFACJO) as the Dispute Resolution Mechanism and Center for the Islamic Finance Industry, 2 J.
ISLAMIC BANKING & FIN. 15, 16–17 (2014).
133 See Why English Law Governs Most International Commercial Contracts, supra note 27.
134 Leonardo S.p.A., Case No. 12 of 2019, Judgment ¶ 44.
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customary international law.135 These international treaties
cannot artificially be divorced from “English law” because constitutional statutes such as the Human Rights Act permeate
every aspect of English law.136 When the AIFC Court comes to
apply English law it should do so in its entirety, as that is how
it would have been applied by the courts of England and Wales.
Any other result would be inconsistent with the parties’ legitimate expectations. Moreover, the wording of Article 13(5) suggests wholesale “legal transplantation,” which has not only
failed as a model of law reform but has universally been condemned by the scholarly community.137 No doubt, it would be
disastrous for the reputation of AIFC if the parties or the Court
were to identify gross inconsistencies between English law and
AIFC Acts, or the Kazakhstani Constitution itself! Article 13(6)
of the AIFC Constitutional Statute makes much more sense. It
states that, “[i]n adjudicating disputes, the AIFC Court is bound
by the Acting Law of the AIFC and may also take into account
final judgments of the AIFC Court in related matters and final
judgments of the courts of other common law jurisdictions.”138
Another serious issue to consider is the extent to which the
AIFC Court is bound by the customary law and international
treaties to which Kazakhstan is a party. Some treaties—such as
those concerning human rights—are territorial, including effective control over foreign territory, and, hence, apply in respect of
any action in the incumbent state’s territory, irrespective of the
constitutional status of the person or entity in question.139 We
have already stated that the separation of the AIFC Court from
the ordinary Kazakhstani judiciary through the constitution has
no retrospective effect on subsequent treaties but it may affect
its rights and duties if Kazakhstan were to carve out a special
135 See Tawhida Ahmed & Israel de Jesús Butler, The European Union
and Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 17 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 771,
776 (2006).
136 Human Rights Act, 1998 c. 42 (Eng.).
137 Jaakko Husa, Developing Legal System, Legal Transplants, and Path
Dependents: Reflections on the Rule of Law, 6 CHINESE J. COMPAR. L. 129, 137
(2018); Toby S. Goldbach, Why Legal Transplants?, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
583, 584 (2019).
138 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(6), at 10.
139 See U.N. Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r, The United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, Fact Sheet No. 30/Rev. 17 (2012).
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regime in those treaties (whether negative or positive) for the
AIFC Court. Although this matter is not made explicit in the
AIFC Constitutional Statute, it is spelled out elsewhere. For example, Part 5, Section 45(1) of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations
makes it clear that AIFC awards and judgments are tantamount
to Kazakhstani awards and judgments for the purposes of enforcement in other jurisdictions.140 It should therefore be taken
for granted that the AIFC Court is a Kazakhstani court for the
purposes of Kazakhstan’s treaty, and customary, obligations.141
A. Party Autonomy in the Choice of Governing Law
The attractiveness of special regimes such as the AIFC lies
not only in the business and financial benefits and incentives
provided to foreign investors, but also on account of the attendant legal certainty and the rule of law. Given that arbitration is a readily available choice that is susceptible to global enforcement, a specialized court such as the AIFC Court and its
Gulf competitors must be able to offer something more, or at
least something of an equivalent value. In the case at hand, this
might be the possibility of enforcing AIFC judgments against entities in Kazakhstan, which is otherwise difficult through any
other foreign award because of the alleged obstinacy of Kazakhstani courts.142 Such an incentive should not be underestimated.
No doubt, the processes, and procedures before the AIFC Court
must be as flexible and party-oriented as in international commercial arbitration.

AIFC Regul. on AIFC Acts, supra note 123, pt. 5, ch. 2, § 45(1), at 17.
Even so, it is unlikely that it will be allowed to enforce foreign judgments or awards against the Kazakhstani state. See, for example, Republic of
Kazakhstan v. Ascom Group, S.A., No. 133/19, Judgment, Luxembourg Superior Court of Justice (Dec. 19, 2019), https://jusmundi.com/en/document/pdf/Decision/IDS-379-19122019-11223/en/en-ascom-group-s-a-anatoliestati-gabriel-stati-and-terra-raf-trans-traiding-ltd-v-republic-of-kazakhstanjudgment-of-the-luxembourg-court-of-appeal-unofficial-english-translationthursday-19th-december-2019, where the court recognized and enforced an
award in the hundreds of millions of dollars range, which the Kazakhstani government unsuccessfully tried to prove was awarded based on fraudulent
grounds.
142 See Dispute Resolution Around the World: Kazakhstan, BAKER
MCKENZIE 1, 11 (2009), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2016/10/dratw/dratw_kazakhstan_2009.pdf?la=en.
140
141
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In this respect, the ability of the parties to choose the law of
their choice is of immense importance. This right is aptly recognized in Section 43 of the AIFC Regulations on AIFC Acts, which
provides that “[a]n express choice of a governing law in a contract is effective against all Persons affected by the choice.”143 In
the absence of a choice of law clause, the contract is to be governed by the Acting Law of the AIFC,144 which is effectively the
law of England and Wales, as this is supplemented by the various other sources analyzed in previous sections. This is a somewhat unsatisfactory situation. While it provides a degree of legal certainty to the parties, this situation is, nonetheless, rather
antithetical to the general rule, whereby in the absence of a
choice of governing law this is either selected by reference to private international law rules (in litigation),145 or by reference to
the law that is closest to the parties’ contract (arbitration).146 It
may well be that the drafters of this provision desired to avoid
complex conflicts of law determinations that protract and complicate proceedings, in which case this is a welcome compromise.
However, Article 43 is incomplete and poses a serious danger to
the parties. In particular, it is unclear if the notion of “governing” law follows the Rome Convention paradigm,147 or if, instead,
it is predicated on the much broader party autonomy paradigm
set out in international arbitration, whereby it is not restricted
AIFC Regul. on AIFC Acts, supra note 123, pt. 5, ch. 2, § 43, at 20.
Id. pt. 5, ch. 2, § 44, at 20.
145 C.M.V. CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 218–20 (4th
ed. 2011). The 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations was consolidated several times. See generally 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6
[hereinafter Rome I], for the current version of the law applicable to contractual obligations.
146 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 97, ch. VI, art. 28(2), at 17; see
2017 Arbitration Rules, INT’L CHAMBER COM. (2017), https://iccwbo.org/disputeresolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/#article_21 (providing in
Article 21(1) that in the absence of an express choice of substantive law, “the
arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate”); see also ILIAS BANTEKAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 38–40 (2015) (explaining that Article 4(1) of Rome 1 indicates
that absent a choice of law clause, disputes are governed pursuant to the law
of a party’s residence).
147 H. Matthew Horlacher, The Rome Convention and the German Paradigm: Forecasting the Demise of the European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 27 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 178, 178–80 (1994). The
conflict rules of the forum will set out particular criteria which link the contract in question to a system of law – these criteria are known as “connecting
factors.” See Rome I, supra note 145, art. 4(1).
143
144
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to the “legal system” of a country.
Unlike the Rome I Article 1(1) restrictions on the conflict of
laws rules—i.e., the meaning of “law” as it concerns governing
law over a dispute—which limit the governing law of a particular legal system, “such as that of France, the situation is different in respect of arbitral proceedings.”148 Under Rome I:
‘African customary law,’ the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts or ‘Islamic law’ are not considered
national legal systems as such, the justification being that they are
indeterminate and vague and hence give rise to uncertainty.149 It
is thought that trying to determine what Islamic law is in a particular case, as opposed to Saudi law which despite its sharia foundation is considered predictable, would give rise to several confusing and conflicting versions and interpretations.150

These perceptions on the meaning of ‘law’ and ‘legal systems’
may be problematic in litigation,151 but not for arbitration because it is not only assumed that the parties are well aware of
the implications of their choice of law (and their ability to choose
the law of their choice) but also because the appointment of arbitrators is based on their expertise of the parties’ chosen law.
Unlike litigation, in international arbitration the parties are
free to designate any ‘law’ as their governing law, irrespective if
148 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 44; see Emmanuel Gaillard, The Role of
the Arbitrator in Determining the Applicable Law, in THE LEADING
ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 185, 197–98 (Lawrence W.
Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2014).
149 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 44; Beximco Pharm. Ltd. v. Shamil Bank
of Bahrain E.C., [2004] EWCA 19.
150 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 44. “This is because in strict legal terms
there is no single or unified Islamic law.” Id. at 44 n.18. “The four key sources
of Sunni Islamic law on the basis of their hierarchy are as follows: 1) Qur’an;
2) the sunnah (representing the sayings and actions of the Prophet); 3) qiyas
(human reasoning by analogy, but only if adopted by a large enough majority
of Muslim scholars); and 4) ijma, which represents the actual consensus of the
Muslim scholarly community.” Id. “The four different schools of Sunni Islam,
with the exception of the Qur’an, cannot always agree on the veracity of all the
other sources and in any event ascribe varying interpretations to these and
disputed sources.” Id. “All this justifies the argument as to the non-existence
of a single, coherent, verifiable Islamic law.” Id.
151 And, of course, these limitations are imposed by conflict of law rules as
discussed previously.
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this is classified as a legal system or not under the Rome Convention (or other conflict of law rules). In fact, it is not uncommon for parties to designate as their governing law the lex mercatoria, equitable principles (ex aequo et bono), Islamic law,
public international law and others, such as EU law,152 that are
not ordinarily considered legal systems.153
In the particular context of the AIFC Court, I would like to
think that in the pursuit of commercial justice, experienced foreign judges will conclude that party autonomy is not limited by
the private international law paradigm.154 Rather, the parties
may choose any law or principles, other than the law of a legal
system, as long as it does not offend Kazakhstani public policy
or the AIFC Acting Law.155 It is crucial that the Court clarifies
this position in its first judgments so as to alleviate any concerns
that prospective parties may have.
V.

PARTY AUTONOMY IN RESPECT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

One of the key features of broad party autonomy is the ability of the parties to agree on the procedural rules applicable to
the proceedings, subject, however, to the right to a fair trial.
This principle is applicable regardless of the nature of the proceedings.156 Procedural party autonomy is the cornerstone of arbitration.157 The voluntary character of arbitration would be
152 For an example of a case where the parties designated European Union
law as their governing law, see Gaillard, supra note 148, at 201 & n.33.
153 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 44–45; see also In re Arb. between Raisler
Corporation & N.Y.C. Housing Auth., 32 N.Y.2d 274, 283 (1973) (holding that
“an arbitrator may decide the issues as equity and justice require, unbound by
the rigors of law”). Given that the parties had not authorized the arbitrator to
act as amiable compositeur or decide the case ex aequo et bono, this case may
be a bit of a stretch.
154 This conclusion is further enhanced by Section 29(1)(c) of the AIFC
Court Regulations, which reads that the law to be applied by the Court shall
be “such law as appears to the Court to be the most appropriate in the facts
and circumstances of the dispute.” See AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt.
8, § 29(1)(c), at 21.
155 Id. pt. 8, § 29(1)(b), at 21.
156 See Ilias Bantekas, Equal Treatment of Parties in International Commercial Arbitration, 69 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 991, 991–93, 1001 (2020).
157 Sunday A. Fagbemi, The Doctrine of Party Autonomy in International
Commercial Arbitration: Myth or Reality?, 9 AFE BABALOLA UNIV. J. SUST. DEV.
L. & POL’Y 222, 224 (2015).
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seriously undermined if the parties were unable to dictate how
arbitral proceedings are to be held and conducted. Control over
the process is hardly an end to itself. Its purpose is to mitigate
the adverse qualities of litigation or alternative dispute resolutions and, hence, to ultimately satisfy the parties’ business demands in a particular case.158 By way of illustration, if the dispute concerns a sensitive or pressing issue, the parties may well
urge the tribunal to resolve the dispute as timely as possible,159
perhaps through fast-track proceedings. Equally, if the parties
feel that a hearing would spiral costs and provide little clarity to
the dispute, they can decide to dispense with an oral hearing altogether, agreeing solely to a documents-based process.160
The prevalence of party autonomy in the conduct of arbitral
proceedings is manifest in both the New York Convention and
the Model Law, as well as customary international law; the latter as evidenced by the consistent laws and judicial practice of
states, as well as the proliferation of institutional rules to this
effect.161 Article 19(1) of the Model Law provides that “the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings[,]”162 whereas Article
V(1)(d) of the New York Convention stipulates that a foreign
award may be refused enforcement and recognition if “the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties . . . .”163 The parties are free to choose any model they
desire or no model whatsoever, or, alternatively, leave this task
to the tribunal.164
The AIFC Court, as well as its other foreign counterparts,
was meant to function as a conventional court, albeit with all the
benefits and privileges typically associated with specialized

See Fagbemi, supra note 157, at 223–24.
Id. at 230.
160 See id.
161 Advocate Rajveer, Parties’ autonomy in international commercial arbitration, 9 INT’L J. SCI. & ENG’G RSCH. 1204, 1204 (2018).
162 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 97, ch. V, art. 19(1), at 14.
163 The New York Convention, supra note 100, art. V(1)(d), at 10.
164 See, e.g., THE LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, THE
LCIA ARBITRATION RULES art. 22.1(vi) (2014), https://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx#Article%2022.
158
159
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hybrid tribunals.165 Hence, there is nothing in the AIFC Laws,
including the AIFC Court Rules, suggesting that party autonomy may, or can, supersede the prevailing rules of civil procedure. Even so, although this has not yet been tested, a minor
window of opportunity does exist. Section 29(1)(c) of the AIFC
Court Regulations allows the Court to apply “such [procedural]
law as appears to the Court to be most appropriate in the facts
and circumstances of the dispute.”166 Although such a determination will ultimately be made by the Court, the parties may
offer their views to which the Court can be receptive.167 In this
manner, the AIFC Court may circumvent non-mandatory procedural rules, seemingly on its own initiative and in the best interest of proceedings, even if triggered by the parties. This line
of thinking is further enhanced by Sections 30(1) and (2) of the
AIFC Court Regulations, which confer on the Chief Justice a
wide margin of discretion, even above arbitrators—the latter being limited by the parties’ agreement.168 This reads:
(1) AIFC Court Rules and Practice Directions may provide for the
practice and procedure to be followed in the Court. They may be
made, amended, repealed, or revoked, by the Chief Justice of the
Court only, except that he may nominate a Judge of the Court to
exercise his functions under this Article.
(2) AIFC Court Rules may provide for any matter of practice or
procedure to be made and/or governed by Practice Directions.169

The Court Rules and Practice Directions thus have the potential
of conferring significant discretionary powers on judges in applying and shaping rules of procedure and evidence. The range
of experienced judges appointed to the AIFC Court essentially
ensures that the judges will be prepared to work with the parties
in shaping their rules in such a manner that promotes the parties’ mutual interests and the interests of procedural justice.170

165
166
167
168
169
170

Zambrana-Tévar, supra at note 24, at 123.
AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 8, § 29(1)(c), at 21.
See AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(6), at 10.
AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 9, § 30(1)–(2), at 22.
Id.
See id. pt. 2, § 12, at 6–8.
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This is very evident in the AIFC Court Rules.171 In theory, the
entire process is subject to the so-called “overriding principles,”
as these are set out in Article 1.7 of the AIFC Court Rules, which
are based on the notions of justice, fairness, and proportionality,
and which the Court is obliged to enforce in its administration
of justice.172 Part 16 of the AIFC Court Rules sets out an extensive outline for case progression conferences in which the parties
are expected to take on an active role by agreeing on appropriate
case management directions.173
VI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE AIFC COURT AND ITS POWERS
The AIFC Court consists of only two instances, namely first
and appellate levels.174 Decisions of the appellate chamber are
binding and not subject to further judicial scrutiny175 and as a
result, produce res judicata. There is a further specialist division in the form of a small claims court.176 The AIFC Court is
headed by the Chief Justice and consists of other judges, all of
which are “appointed and removed by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the recommendation of the Governor of
the AIFC.”177 Although Article 13(2) of the AIFC Constitutional
Statute emphasizes that the Court is an independent body, the
appointment and removal of its judges by the President seriously
undermines claims of independence.178

171 At the time of writing, the Chief Justice had already issued AIFC Court
Rules, effective as of January 1, 2018. See Astana Int’l Fin. Ctr. Ct. Rules pt.
1, §§ 1.6–1.8, at 1 (2018) (Kaz.), https://aifc.kz/files/legals/69/file/3.-legislationaifc-court-rules-2018.pdf [hereinafter AIFC Ct. Rules 2018]. In accordance
with Art 1.5 of the AIFC Court Rules, Practice Directions “may modify or disapply any provision of [the] Rules.” Id. pt. 1, § 1.5, at 1.
172 Id. §§ 1.6–1.7, at 1.
173 Id. § 16, at 45–47.
174 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(3), at 10.
175 Id. art. 13(7), at 10.
176 See AIFC Ct. Rules 2018, supra note 171, pt. 1, § 1.3(1), at 1; AIFC Ct.
Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 2, § 9, at 6.
177 See AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(3-1), at 10.
178 Id. art. 13(2), (3-1); see also G.A. Res. 40/32, Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary (Nov. 29, 1985) (“The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or
law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to
respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.”); Stephen B. Burbank,
Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95
GEO. L. J. 909, 912 (2007) (discussing that judicial accountability and
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The powers of the Court are set out in the AIFC Court’s extensive Rules, which, as already stated, were drafted by the
Court’s Chief Justice.179 Significant effort has been placed in
these Rules to balance the public nature of the Court with the
need to make it as amenable as possible to the degree of party
autonomy typically associated with international arbitration.180
This balancing test seems to have been undertaken in a very
masterful way. It is beyond the scope of this relatively narrow
paper to undertake a thorough analysis of the Court’s extensive
Rules, so we will instead attempt a brief insight into some key
or innovative features, namely, the availability of Group Litigation Orders (GLOs) in the event of several claims giving rise to
common or related issues of fact or law (“GLO issues”).181
Another unique feature of the AIFC Court Rules is the possibility of a so-called “immediate judgment” under circumstances specified in Part 14 of the AIFC Court Rules.182 Part 15
of the Court Rules consists of an exceptionally detailed section
on interim remedies and the condition for granting these to a
claimant.183 This may appeal to investors and their counsel who
fear that foreign awards against Kazakhstani entities would not
be followed up by worldwide injunction orders by the courts of
the seat.184 Part 16 of the Court Rules sets out the contours of
party-led case progression conferences, which, as already stated,
requires the parties to agree on how their case will progress.185
This effectively enhances party autonomy to a significant
independence “should run to the public[,]” so that there is “a legitimate interest
in ensuring that the judiciary has been responsible . . . and . . . public laws are
functioning as intended”).
179 AIFC Ct. Rules 2018, supra note 171, pt. 1, § 1.2, at 1.
180 See id. pt. 27, at 76–83.
181 Id. pt. 12, § 12.47, at 33.
182 Id. pt. 14, at 37–38.
183 Id. pt. 15, at 40–45.
184 See Ras Al Khaimah Inv. Auth. v. Bestfort Dev. LLP [2017] EWCA
1014 (finding a freezing order to be the appropriate means to prevent the defendant from dissipating assets prior to a final judgment); Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 55 (Oct. 3, 2019)
(holding that the EU Directive on Electronic Commerce does not prevent national courts from ordering a host provider like Facebook to take down online
content worldwide where the content is declared unlawful pursuant to domestic laws).
185 AIFC Ct. Rules 2018, supra note 171, pt. 16, §§ 16.1–16.11, at 45–46.
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degree.186 Part 20 of the Court Rules establishes a process in
which parties making a settlement offer are not required to show
these offers or payments to the Court until the question of costs
is to be decided (offers to settle and payments into court).187 Part
23 introduces an Abridged Procedure for claims, which includes
situations where the claimant seeks the Court’s decision on a
question unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact or
where a Rule or Practice Direction in relation to a specified type
of proceeding requires or permits the use of the Abridged Procedure.188
VII. ENFORCEMENT OF AIFC COURT JUDGMENTS
The AIFC Constitutional Statute is at pains to emphasize
the sharp distinction between the AIFC Court and the ordinary
Kazakhstani judicial system. However, at the same time, such
a distinction must have some limits, lest it creates more problems than it purports to resolve. With respect to the mutual enforcement of judgments between the AIFC Court and regular
Kazakhstani courts, Article 13, Sections (8) and (9) of the AIFC
Constitutional Statute state:
8. Decisions of the AIFC Court are to be enforced in the Republic
of Kazakhstan in the same way, and on the same terms, as judicial
acts of the courts of the Republic of Kazakhstan. To enforce a decision of the AIFC Court, a translation of the decision into the Kazakh or Russian language, in accordance with the procedure determined by AIFC Acts, is required.
9. Decisions of the courts of the Republic of Kazakhstan are to be
enforced in the territory of the AIFC in accordance with legislation
of the Republic of Kazakhstan.189

This is not only sensible but fully warranted. Any other outcome
whereby the AIFC Court was fully insulated from the Kazakhstani judicial system would have required extensive legislation
186 See Case Management, GOV.UK (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/standard-directions/general/case-management, for an example of the case management practice in England.
187 AIFC Ct. Rules 2018, supra note 171, pt. 20, at 63.
188 Id. pt. 23, at 66–69.
189 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(8), (9), at 10.
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and re-negotiation of the country’s bilateral or multilateral treaties pertinent to its courts.190 From the perspective of foreign
investors, this must surely be the key highlight of the AIFC
Court. Although foreign arbitration would have been more favorable, as stated above, the enforcement of foreign awards will
always be a problem in Kazakhstan.191 The need for arbitration
is redundant since a judgment of AIFC can be enforced ipso
facto, without further restrictions or scrutiny in Kazakhstan, especially if the AIFC Court is viewed to be just as good and independent as foreign-seated arbitral panels. Although Article
13(8) and (9) refer to “decisions,”192 this must be an oversight in
translation, and must also encompass judgments on the merits.
Section 27 of the AIFC Court Regulations provides the
Court with extensive powers of interim and injunctive relief at
all stages of the proceedings.193 On the basis of Article 13(8) and
(9) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute, such orders and decisions
may be enforced in the Republic of Kazakhstan through ordinary
Kazakhstani courts.194 What is unclear, although largely implicit, is whether the AIFC Court is endowed with the power to
issue worldwide injunction orders or whether, in the event of a
conflicting order or judgment issued by regular Kazakhstani
courts, it possesses the authority to dismiss the same.
As for the second issue concerning conflicting judgments
and decisions, the inherent powers of courts and tribunals195
clearly dictates that the AIFC Court, either on its own motion or
at the request of any party, may assess the constitutionality or
Zambrana-Tévar, supra note 24, at 128–29.
Altynay Mukhametkalikyzy, Hidden Impediments Await Foreign Parties Seeking to Enforce Arbitral Awards in Kazakhstan, KLUWER ARB. BLOG
(Apr. 1, 2020), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/04/01/hidden-impediments-await-foreign-parties-seeking-to-enforce-arbitral-awardsin-kazakhstan/?.
192 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(8)–(9), at 10; see also
AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 9, § 40(2), at 24 (“Judgments, orders
and directions of the Court, and awards issued in arbitrations seated in the
AIFC which have been ratified by the Court, may be enforced in the AIFC and
the Republic of Kazakhstan in accordance with the AIFC Constitutional Statute.”).
193 AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 6, § 27, at 18.
194 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 13(8)–(9), at 10.
195 BANTEKAS, supra note 146, at 107–13.
190
191
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another defect of a judgment, including also “in the interests of
justice.”196 It is unfortunate that such authority is not spelled
out clearly in any AIFC Acts because the scope of abuse is significant and may dispel the benefits of enforcement of AIFC
judgments in the Kazakhstani legal order; especially, if a conflicting judgment of the Kazakhstani courts serves to nullify a
judgment or order of the AIFC Court. Therefore, it should not
be taken for granted that any judgment or order of the regular
Kazakhstani courts will not be enforced in the AIFC if it is in
conflict with AIFC Acts, judgments, or orders of the AIFC Court,
or if it fetters the powers of the AIFC Court.
As to the second issue, there is no mention of extra-territorial powers being conferred on the AIFC Court and hence any
order of this nature will have to be referred to the Kazakhstani
courts through the pertinent channels. This eventuality, however, allows the Kazakhstani courts to deny the transmittal of
the order on subjective grounds. Moreover, although the AIFC
Court may transmit such an order for further execution, it is not
clear that its content will not be discussed anew by the Kazakhstani courts.197
VIII. CONSISTENCY WITH AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE AND
ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS
Unlike other specialized hybrid commercial tribunals, the
AIFC features an arbitral institution, fully equipped with its
own arbitration rules.198 Other financial centers, such as the
QFC, do not have a distinct arbitral chamber,199 chiefly because
this would defeat the very purpose of the QFC Court. Of course,
the QFC Court has an active role in arbitrations by acting as the
“competent court,” where appropriate, or in enforcing foreign
awards in the QFC framework.200
Article 14 of the AIFC Constitutional Statute sets up the
AIFC Ct. Regul. 2017, supra note 81, pt. 6, §§ 27, 27(2)(j), at 18–19.
Id. pt. 5, § 26(10), at 17.
198 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48.
199 See
About Us, QATAR INT’L CT. & DISP. RESOL. CTR.,
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/about-us (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).
200 QFC Law No. 2, supra note 47, art. 35.
196
197
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AIFC International Arbitration Centre (IAC) in the form of an
AIFC body,201 and delineates its relationship with the Kazakhstani legal order.202 In accordance with paragraphs three and
four of Article 14, AIFC IAC awards are enforced as domestic
awards in the Kazakhstani legal order and the same is equally
true of awards seated in Kazakhstan.203 The AIFC Court, as already stated, has been designated as the competent court in relation to arbitrations taking place under the AIFC IAC in accordance with Section 14 of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations.204
The Regulations are predicated on the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration (with some exceptions),205 a rather sensible decision. The AIFC Court possesses
a significant supervisory role over arbitral proceedings, including ordering interim measures,206 and the appointment of arbitrators in the event of an impasse.207 However, there are some
instances where significant departure from a merely supervisory
authority is stipulated. For example, Section 18 of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations states that while arbitral proceedings are
confidential, the AIFC Court may rule otherwise through the issuance of an order.208
Section 27 of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations is especially
confusing. Unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law or transnational
arbitral practice whereby the parties are free to approach both
AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra, note 68, art. 14, at 11.
Id. In 2019, Kazakhstan amended its 2016 Law on Arbitration with
the aim of internationalizing its arbitration industry. See Cameron Ford, Kazakhstan Internationalises Arbitration Law, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 19,
2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/08/19/kazakhstaninternationalises-arbitration-law/. The new law is known as the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 217-VI “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts
of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Strengthening the Protection of
Property Rights, Arbitration, Optimizing the Judicial Caseload, and Further
Humanizing the Criminal Law.” Id. It has been welcomed by the international
legal community. See id.
203 AIFC CONST. STATUTE, supra note 68, art. 14(3)–(4), at 11.
204 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, pt. 2, ch. 1, § 14, at 2–3.
205 See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 97.
206 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 2, § 17, at 3; see also Interex
& Co. v. Prom Region KZ LLP, Сase No. АIFC-С/СFI/2020/0001, Judgment ¶
2 (AIFC Ct. of First Instance May 11, 2020), where the court exercised its authority of interim measures to enforce an arbitral award.
207 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 3, § 20, at 4–5.
208 Id. ch. 2, § 18, at 3–4.
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the tribunal and the courts of the seat with all requests concerning the imposition and enforcement of interim measures, this is
not the case in the AIFC Court.209 The bigger part of the provision suggests that all relevant requests fall under the authority
of the tribunal.210 Then, paragraph two goes on to say that:
With the written permission of the arbitral tribunal a party in
whose favour an interim measure has been granted may request
from the AIFC Court of First Instance an order enforcing the arbitral tribunal’s order or any part of it. Any request for permission
or enforcement made under this Article shall be simultaneously
copied to all other parties. Unless the arbitral tribunal at any time
directs otherwise, the party making a request to the AIFC Court
of First Instance under this Article shall be entitled to recover in
the arbitration any legal costs and AIFC Court of First Instance
fees reasonably incurred.211

It is certainly a novelty that the parties must seek permission
from the tribunal before approaching the courts of the seat—in
this case, the AIFC Court—with a request to enforce the order,
given that the tribunal cannot on its own achieve such an outcome.212 So, what if the tribunal does not provide written consent? This does not make much sense and provides a serious
impediment to the parties. Paragraph 3(b) of Section 27 confers
significant power on the AIFC Court in that the latter is permitted to refuse recognition of an interim measure ordered by a
court outside the AIFC if it is found to be ultra vires.213 This is
a powerful tool in the armory of the AIFC Court and may appease investors that Kazakhstani courts are not going to interfere in arbitral proceedings in the AIFC. Paragraph five of Section 27 conforms to the UNCITRAL Model Law by stating that
“[t]he AIFC Court shall have the same power of issuing an interim measure in relation to arbitration proceedings, where
their seat is in the AIFC, as it has in relation to proceedings in

209 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 4, § 27, at 7–9; UNCITRAL
Model Law, supra note 97, ch. IV.A, § 1, art. 17(1), at 9.
210 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 4, § 27(1), at 7–8.
211 Id. ch. 4, § 27(2), at 8.
212 Id.
213 Id. ch. 4, § 27(3)(b), at 8.
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the AIFC Court.”214
It is not at all clear if paragraph two is incompatible with
the express and unequivocal terms of paragraph five of Section
27, or if it constitutes a very exceptional deviation from the general rule enunciated in paragraph five.215
Finally, Section 45 of the AIFC Arbitration Rules makes it
crystal clear that all awards issued by the AIFC tribunal, as well
as awards issued elsewhere, are to be enforced in the AIFC
Court in accordance with the bilateral and multilateral treaties
to which Kazakhstan is a party.216 Hence, for the purposes of
enforcement of awards and judgments, the AIFC is not an exceptional territory for which Kazakhstan would have been obliged
to make a unilateral declaration. Moreover, AIFC awards are
Kazakhstani awards for the purposes of the New York Convention.217
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper has taken a critical stance on the AIFC Court,
pointing out both shortcomings and various positive features
that make the Court stand out from ordinary Kazakhstani
courts. None of this criticism was meant as an attack against
this institution; quite the contrary. The AIFC Court is a beacon
of the rule of law in Kazakhstan and a first attempt at creating
an impartial judicial institution that is independent of bias and
the intervention of government;218 or at least, so it is hoped.
214 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 4, § 27(5), at 9; UNCITRAL
Model Law, supra note 97, ch. IV.A, § 1, art. 17(1), at 9.
215 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 4, § 27(2), (5), at 9; see also
KAZ. CODE OF CIV. PROC., supra note 121, art. 492 (determining the criteria under which award creditors may apply for interim measures against assets
owned by a sovereign state).
216 AIFC Arb. Regul. 2017, supra note 48, ch. 7, pt. 3, § 45, at 16.
217 Philip Kim, Why arbitrate at the Astana International Financial Centre?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 19, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/09/19/why-arbitrate-at-the-astana-international-financial-centre/.
218 Arif Durrani & Gabe Kirchheimer, Why Invest in Kazakhstan?,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 20, 2018), https://sponsored.bloomberg.com/news/sponsors/aifc/why-invest-in-kazakhstan/?adv=19268&prx_t=hSIEAAAAAAFEANA.
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Unfortunately, this is not enough since the very need to establish the AIFC and the AIFC Court necessarily stems from the
fact that Kazakhstan is not perceived as providing the legal and
political stability for trade and investment.219 The AIFC is designed as an “island of difference” from the ordinary Kazakhstani investment and trade landscape, even if it is focused on
specific investments in theory.220 This is not the case with the
AIFC’s Gulf counterparts, where healthy and diversified economies already existed, and political and legal stability were never
issues of concern.221 What this means is that Kazakhstan should
make every effort to feed the work of the AIFC Court into its
judicial and legal system. If this does not occur, then the AIFC
will be an illegitimate institution that sustains a regime that is
averse to overall change.
No doubt, with the proliferation of international courts and
tribunals, the AIFC Court will endeavor to make its mark. Recent history has shown that the stature, authority, and overall
gravitas of individual judges make or break the reputation and
credibility of an international court.222 Conformity only helps an
institution hide in obscurity, which is exactly what the AIFC
Court and AIFC do not want.223 These institutions are desirous
of visibility, the boosting of investor confidence, and the perception that justice is not only served but served at the highest possible level.

See Durrani & Kirchheimer, supra note 218.
Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Will Astana’s financial gamble pay off?,
EURASIANET (Aug. 7, 2018), https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-will-astanas-financial-gamble-pay-off.
221 Zambrana-Tévar, supra note 24, at 122.
222 The AIFC Court employs judges with international reputation and experience, including its first chief justice, Lord Woolf. See Justices, AIFC,
https://court.aifc.kz/who-we-are/justices/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2020). The current line-up is equally impressive, led by Lord Mance. Id.
223 See Reuters Staff, Seeking Belt buckle role, Kazakhstan launches
China-backed financial hub, REUTERS (July 5, 2018, 7:19 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-aifc/seeking-belt-buckle-rolekazakhstan-launches-china-backed-financial-hub-idUSKBN1JV1CG, for a
discussion regarding the AIFC’s hope that outside companies will utilize its
dispute resolution services and that the AIFC Court’s desire to become an “intermediary between larger nations and a gateway for foreign investment”
while, unlike other courts of a similar nature, not requiring its members to be
present in the Kazakhstani capital.
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We are still in the AIFC’s infancy and, hopefully, all of these
goals will end up being materialized. Given the growth of the
Kazakhstani economy and the companies listed in the AIFC, it
is a matter of time before they realize that speedy dispute resolution is better served in the AIFC Court as opposed to international commercial arbitration; particularly, if the Kazakhstani
government is seen honoring international awards against its
public entities both abroad, but more importantly, at home.
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